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Abstract
Historical sovereign debt literature employed an inadequate measure of bonds’ yields,
namely the internal rate of return or its special case, the coupon-price ratio. It is argued
that periodical rates of return are a better measurement because they closely emulate an
investor who reconsiders her investment position periodically, rather than maintaining a
portfolio until bond maturity. The empirical relevance isassessed showing that the “good
housekeeping seal of approval” hypothesis hinges on measuring yields by coupon-price
ratio.
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Resumo
A literatura acerca títulos de dívida soberanos históricos empregou uma medida inade-
quada de retornos de títulos, a taxa interna de retorno ou o seu caso especial, a razão
cupom-preço. Argumenta-se que taxa periódica de retorno é uma medida mais apropri-
ada porque simula o retorno obtido por um investidor que reconsidera a posição de inves-
timento periodicamente, em contraposição ao comportamento que supõe a manutenção
em carteira de títulos até maturidade. A relevância empírica é avaliada mostrando que
a hipótese de “selo de aprovação” depende da medição de retornos pela razão cupom-
preço.
Código JEL: N20; F33; G15.
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11 Introduction
A large body of international ﬁnancial history literature made use of a speciﬁc mea-
sure of yield, the internal rate of return or its special case, the coupon-price ratio.
Examples extend across several different subﬁelds. Making use of the former, Lin-
dert and Morton [1989] discussed the treatment of defaulters since 1850, showing
evidence that investors paid little attention to the past payment record of borrowing
governments; Eichengreen and Portes [1989] compared the widespread default of
the 1930s and the debt crisis of the eighties, evaluating the intensity of defaults for
the interwar years and assessing the effectiveness of a range of strategies adopted
by the various parties to settle debt. More recently, Mauro et al. [2006] compared
the determinants of borrowing costs related to debt ﬂoated between 1870 and First
World War with similar costs today, using coupon-price ratio for the historical pe-
riod. Applying the same measure, Tomz [2007] studied the perceived riskiness of
a borrower – its reputation – comparing new to “seasoned” borrowers bond yields.
In common, all these studies employed internal rates or return of its particular case,
the coupon-price ratio, to measure yields.
This paper argues that internal rates of return and coupon-price ratios are not
adequate measures of historical sovereign bond yield, which are better measured by
periodical (monthly, yearly, etc.) rates of return. The main criticism is that the for-
mulation usually employed assumes that the portfolio decisions are taken once and
kept for an inﬁnite time span or until bond maturity. Moreover, coupon-price ratio
is a special case of internal rates of return when considering additionally that (i)
there are no amortizations and (ii) coupon payments are constant and do not cease,
i. e., securities are consols. These conditions can also be interpreted as inexistence
of defaults (either in principal or coupons), even if on the brink of occurrence, and
unlikely to hold. In contrast, periodical rates of return closely emulate a hypothetic
investor behavior who reassesses its investment position periodically and to whom
asset price revaluation directly matters. Formal deﬁnitions and derivations are pre-
sented in the second section, where it will also be shown that periodic revaluation
of investment position is a close analog for investors that put positive weight on
principal revaluation.
In the meantime, several papers stressed what came to be known as the “good
housekeeping seal of approval” hypothesis, after the homonymous paper by Bordo
and Rockoff[1996], and complementedby Bordo and Rockoff [1996], Obstfeld and
Taylor [2003], Cameron et al. [2006], Schularick [2006], Ferguson and Schularick
[2006] and Morys [2007], to cite just a few. These papers provide empirical evi-
dence that countries accrued better yields on sovereign debt when they adopted the
gold standard during the classical period (1870–1914), because only those that un-
dertook their macroeconomic policy “housekeeping” would be capable of adopting
the regime, sending a good signal over to bondholders and improving borrowing
2terms1. This theory will be reevaluated and the empirical relevance of periodical
rate of return versus coupon-price ratio duality will be tested.
Some other modiﬁcations are made to the existing empirical approach. First
of all, a new database is employed, the monthly publication Investor’s Monthly
Manual from the London Stock Exchange, that registered bond-level information
for all months and all countries, such as prices, coupon payments, defaults, Fund-
ing Loans, and renegotiations, if applicable. The important increase in degrees of
freedom due to the new regression frequency does not revert itself in ﬁnding more





Individual regressions and Seemingly Unrelated Regressions are employed instead.
Furthermore, it is documented that gold standard is associated with smaller spread
dispersion. Because smaller dispersion is associated with smaller spread in a risk-
averse environment, a dispersion measurement establishes itself as a necessary re-
gression control.
In order to allow a direct comparison with the literature, regressions are per-
formed in the same frequency used by previous authors, i.e. yearly regressions. It
is shown that the “good housekeeping” hypothesis are very sensitive to sovereign
bond yield measurement. Overall, empirical support is only found for Italy in a
sample of twenty countries. This result both underlines the importance of internal
versus periodical rates of return issue and undermines the empirical relevance of
sovereign bond yield gains due to gold standard adoption.
1As measured by internal rate of return.
32 Rates of Return
The internal rate of return rt is deﬁned as the rate that zeroes the net discounted
present value of a sequence of future cashﬂow, denoted as {C0,C1,...,Ct,...}. It is






i = 0 (1)
If an investor buys a security and keeps until maturity, the bond price is a negative
cashﬂow at t = 0, and coupons (or dividends) and amortizations are accrued over
the life of the bond. The calculation of the rate of return thus requires a set of hy-
pothesis concerning the behavior of future cashﬂow, such as if amortization are at
par or market value, if defaults are expected, and in such case, whether a fraction of
the amount due was paid. Thus internal rates of return, in its ex-ante speciﬁcation,
require a strong set of assumptionsregarding the perceived future behavior of bonds
for a investor undertaking portfolio investment positions at each point in time. One
could replace it by an ex-post speciﬁcation, using realizations in place of forecasts,
but this would simply mean perfect previsibility for an investor undertaking portfo-
lio decision some time before.
A even more speciﬁc measurement yield is very often employed, the coupon-
price ratio, a special case of internal rates of return when considering the following
additional hypothesis: (i) there are no amortizations and (ii) coupon payments are
constant over time and do not cease, i. e., securities are consols and defaults do not
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Clearly, the non-existence of default cannot be a reasonable assumption, specially
when analyzing bonds that may or did enter into distress during the period consid-
ered.
Because principal revaluation cannot be considered a cashﬂow, the internal rate
of return or coupon-price ratio fail to fully account for the effects of hikes or stum-
bles in asset price. The only inﬂuence of bond price into yields is indirect: for
example, if a country goes into distress without falling into arrears, coupon-price
ratio would capture an increase in return due to the fact that coupon payments got
cheaper in relation to bond price. Principal reevaluation does not play any direct
role.
Suppose a investor who revaluates its position periodically, hypothetically buy-
ing bonds in the beginning of the period, carrying over to the end of the period
while realizing any eventual coupon payments during the possession of the bond.











which shall be called periodical rates of return. This measurement can also be
motivated by adapting internal rates of return for the same set of hypothesis, i.e.,
considering a negative cashﬂow the price of bond in t, a positive cashﬂow in t +1,














It should be noted that equation (4) is a close analog to the coupon-price ratio,
except for a lagged price instead of a price contemporaneous to coupon payments,
appended by a principal revaluation term, i.e., the percentage price movement. In
this sense, coupon-price reneges principal revaluation. In the situation of a country
under stress, this term could be of greater magnitude than coupon-price (or coupon-
lagged price increase) and lead a fall in periodical rate of return.
The identity between equations (3) and (4) highlights that the main criticism is
aimed at the set of hypothesis concerning internal rate of return calculation, or sim-
ilarly what should be considered a cashﬂow, demanding fundamental assessment of
investor behavior. Following the literature, in the rest of this article the term “inter-
nal rates of return” refers to the set of hypotheses concerning the holding of bonds
until maturity. Whether defaults were taken into account or amortizations made at
par or market values was speciﬁed differently in each particular article.
Preference for a particular set of hypothesis should be related to the liquidity
of asset or investment considered, i. e., the possibility that the investment position
is undone. Principal revaluation may be indeed irrelevant when evaluating invest-
ment projects comprised of assets that cannot be sold or undone at reasonable cost,
because the decision of undertaking an investment project composed of illiquid as-
sets require that it is ex-ante assigned a very low or nil probability to the course of
actions that involves a complete bail out. This depicts a situation where, for exam-
ple, it is being evaluated whether a factory should be erected. In contrast, ﬁnancial
securities in general are highly liquid.
The next section assesses whether this theoretical query results in different con-
clusions in empirical exercises. From a menu of possible applications, the tradi-
tional “good housekeeping seal of approval” hypothesis is reevaluated and very
different conclusions emerge.
A ﬁrst evidence is shown in Figure 1 below. For twenty countries2, for all its
bonds ﬂoated in London and for all years comprised 1870 and 1915, the ﬁrst dif-
ference of coupon-price ratio is plotted against the ﬁrst difference of yearly rates
2Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt,
France, Greece, India, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, United States of
America
5of return. It evidences a slight negative correlation between the growth of the two
deﬁnitions of rates of return, indicating that empirical conclusions can be very sig-
niﬁcantly modiﬁed. The next section shows that it is indeed the case.
Figure 1: Internal Rates and Periodical Rates of Return
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63 Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval
Between 1850s and the beginning of the First World War, the world witnessed a pe-
riod of intense ﬁnancial integration. Flows of commerce, labor and capital became
more intense than ever3. This heyday of globalization was also characterized by the
diffusion of one aspect of economic policy: the gold standard was adopted by over
30 countries4 in the period comprised between 1870 and 1914. The regime, char-
acterized by the pegging of local currencies in terms of a gold weight, implicitly
determined a ﬁxed exchange parity between participating countries.
In a seminal paper entitled the “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval”, Bordo
and Rockoff [1996] pointed to the reduction of spreads of sovereign bond yields
against its risk-free counterpart, the British consols, when countries adopted the
regime. Several other articles found similar results, such as Obstfeld and Taylor
[2003], Cameron et al. [2006], Schularick [2006], Ferguson and Schularick [2006]
and Morys [2007]. All of them measured yields as coupon-price ratios.
The recurrent proposition is that gold standard adherence signaled to interna-
tional investors the good quality of internal economic policies, due to the fact that
onlythosewithconservativeﬁscal and monetary stances wouldbe capableofadopt-
ing the regime. In an environment deeply characterized by informational asymme-
try between borrowers and lenders (mostly the London City), signaling would be
of foremost importance. Alternatively, it was argued by Bordo and Kydland [1995]
that gold standard adoption could be interpreted as a binding commitmentover gov-
ernments,implyingbetterprevisibilityoffuturebehaviorandsmallerchanceofdebt
reneging.
However, it is not clear that an asymmetric environment prevailed. Judging by
theavailabilityand quality ofinformationavailable, onecould assumethat investors
were all but isolated. Several publications contained economic news, such as In-
vestor’s Monthly Manual itself, The Times newspaper and the informational bundle
was often complemented by country-speciﬁc publications. For instance, even for a
remotecountry such as Brazil there was a weekly BrazilianReview, edited in Rio de
Janeiro and circulated also in London. Several other publications were available for
the remaining countries. If the fundamental asymmetry of information highlighted
by the authors concerns the states of economic policies, it is very likely that these
publications covered that information; if asymmetry concerns the underlying type
of borrower, the gold standard could hardly enhance the beliefs, insofar countries
could simply at any time renege the regime.
The database is composed by the Investor’s Monthly Manual, from the London
Stock Exchange. It consists of a monthly record of several data about the London ﬁ-
nancial market, such as bond prices, yields, amounts unredeemed, coupon payment
3Hogendorn [1998] studies capital mobility in historical perspective. He ﬁnds that only in the
1990s the same level of mobility of the classical period was reached.
4Meissner [2005]
7dates, so as a brief summary of news of countries and private companies with debt
ﬂoated in the City.
For each country, yields are calculated in six different ways, all possibilities
between three different prices constructions (opening price, mean of last and latest
prices, mean of high and low prices) and two deﬁnitions of return (coupon-price
ratio and periodical rate of return). Robustness was required among models that
only differ by price deﬁnition. A 10% signiﬁcant regressor awarded one point;
5%, two points, and 1%, three points. A speciﬁc regressor is considered robust to
price deﬁnition if at least two thirds of possible“signiﬁcance points”were awarded.
Hence, for example, a regressor was considered robust if it had two 1% and one
10%-signiﬁcant estimatives. Only central government bonds were included in the
sample5 and bond-speciﬁc yields are grouped by country weighting by the amount
unredeemed, as registered in the same publication. The difference between average
yield of loans for a speciﬁc country and British consol is taken to construct a spread
series6.
The sample is constituted of twenty countries with corresponding gold standard
adoption dates presented in Table 1 below. It is bounded below by data availability
(for most countries, starting in 1871), and by the assassination of Archduke Franz
Ferdinand in Sarajevo, in 28th June 1914.
Gold standard could have as a side-effect the enhancement of previsibility of
spreads and its lower dispersion, i.e., it is possible that the regime is associated
with smaller spread dispersion as well as with smaller spreads. Because risk-averse
investors would charge for greatest risk dispersion, it is a necessary control in the
forthcoming regressions. To gain intuition whether it is empirically relevant, each
point in Figure 2 indicates a country in all gold standard years against a country in
all other exchange rate regimes. Albeit some outliers, spread dispersion diminishes
as countries adopted the gold standard. This is clearer in Figure 3, were it is shows
spread dispersion and gold standard exhibit a remarkable association (once again)
for the Brazilian case.
5See appendix for a full index of bonds included in the sample. Provincial, municipal and
railway debt were excluded from the sample with an assumption that they behave differently than
sovereign debt. The former was often not guaranteed by central government and the latter has
tangible collateral, the rail or the rail company themselves.
6British consol yields are computed with same methodology.
8Table 1: Countries in Sample and Gold Standard Adoption Dates
COUNTRY GOLD STANDARD ADOPTION




















Sources: Bordo and Kydland [1995] and Meissner [2005].
9Figure 2: Gold Standard and Spreads Dispersion
Each ◦ means a country on gold standard; × means a country off gold standard.
Dispersion in period t is measured as spread variance in window [t −11,t].










































Figure 3: Brazilian Gold Standard and Spreads Variance
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10For all countries, within an individual regressions and Seemingly Unrelated Re-
gressions framework, the following models were estimated in yearly frequency7:
SPREADt = b1+b2 GSt +b3 DAMt +b4 UKt (5)
+b5 SPREADt−1+et (6)
SPREADt = b1+b2 GSt +b3 DISPt +b4 DAMt +b5 UKt (7)
+b6 SPREADt−1+et (8)
where GSt stands for a gold standard dummy (= 1 in case the country adopted
the regime); DISPt is a measurement of spreads dispersion, the mean of monthly
spread variance in previous eleven months; DAMt is the ﬁrst difference of amount
unredeemed8 and UKt is British consol yield.
Because monthly data are available in the publication, the regressions are also
adapted for monthlyfrequency. A sixth-orderautorregressivestructure and ﬁvesea-
sonal dummies9 are appended to the previous model. Notwithstanding the increase
of lag structure and inclusion of seasonal dummies, some regressions fail to pass
the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation residual test. The conjecture is that prices
are not falling as expected in coupon payment months, generating regular spread
spikes. If that is the case, it could be understood as a violation from expected ar-
bitrage conditions, since investors could increase proﬁt by buying bonds in coupon
payment dates and selling in all other months. This query will be left as a future
research suggestion and it will not be analysed in this article. However, it can be
shown that in such case the magnitude of the bias over least squares estimator is
minimal10.
Due to unavailability of data for all economies, three variables were omitted:
level of reserves, exchange rates and a ﬁscal variable. Higher levels of reserves
are likely correlated with smaller spreads, but also tend to be associated with gold
standard adoption, since only in good times the country would venture adopting a
ﬁxed exchange rate regime. Thus it is possible that, by omitting this variable, a
perceived negative effect of gold standard into spreads is actually due to increase of
level of the reserves. Similar reasoning applies to both of the remaining variables.
By possibly holding exchange rate overvalued, gold standard avoids wealth-effects
of foreign-denominated debt; holding exchange rates ﬁxed requires a conservative
ﬁscal stance. Common to all these arguments is that their omission generates a
negative bias in regressors11.
7Results show that spread between countries’ yield and british consol yield are correlated with
british consol yield itself.
8Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests fail to reject unit root null hypothesis in
level.
9The i-th dummy equals one if in month i or i+6.
10Proof available upon request.
11It is unlikely that a suitable instrument could be found for the gold standard dummy variable,
because the instrument could not be correlated with residuals and one could always argue that the
market looks into all available information to price a security.
11Results are shown in the two tables that follow. Table 2 collects signiﬁcance
on gold standard dummy and dispersion variable (if applicable), according to price
deﬁnition robustness requirement previously commented12.
Results show that yield measurement matters. For the yearly regressions, the
same periodicity used in all the other studies, the set of countries that exhibit better
yields under gold standard adoption (under Seemingly Regressions Framework) is
Ecuador, Egypt, Italy, Peru and United States. Argentina and Sweden exhibit the
opposite (signiﬁcant) effect. Changing to periodical rates of return, only Chile and
Italy show the reckoned effect. A similar result is obtained using the individual
regressions framework: ﬁve countries are reduced to none.
Because monthly data are available, the exercise is repeated using this fre-
quency,althoughregressionsresultneededadjustmentstocontrolforserially-correlated
residualsandperiodicalspikesduetopossiblyunarbitragedcouponpayments. “Good
housekeeping” does not ﬁnd empirical support, even using coupon-price ratios.
Now,morecountriesshowthecontraryeffectthanavowedbytheliterature–Austria-
Hungary, Norway, Sweden – than in accordance with it – only Denmark. Again,
only Italy is robust to frequency and yield measurement changes. That is, only for
this country the hypothesis is possibly conﬁrmed.
It is noteworthy that the dispersion variable, which is remarkably signiﬁcant for
most countries in the sample, is clearly a necessary regression control.
12Complete results are comprised of approximately a thousand regressions. Due to size limita-
tion, they are not presented here and are available upon request.
12Table 2: Yearly Regressions
WITHOUT DISPERSION WITH DISPERSION
Gold Std. Dummy Gold Std. Dummy Dispersion
Individual & YRR
(+): DEN. (+): DEN. (+): —
(−): — (−): — (−): —
Individual & IRR
(+): SWE. (+): SWE. (+): All but BEL, BUL, FRA, IND,
USA.




(+): — (+): — (+): ECU, NOR, SWE.
(−): FRA. (−): CHL, ITA. (−): —
SUR & IRR
(+): SWE. (+): ARG, SWE. (+): All but BUL, FRA, SWE, USA.
(−): EGT, USA. (−): ECU, EGT, ITA, PER,
USA.
(−): —
ARG ≡ Argentina; AUS ≡ Austria-Hungary; BEL ≡ Belgium; BRZ ≡ Brazil; BUL ≡ Bulgaria; CHL ≡ Chile; DEN ≡ Denmark;
ECU ≡ Ecuador; EGT ≡ Egypt; FRA ≡ France; GRC ≡ Greece; IND ≡ India; ITA ≡ Italy; MEX ≡ Mexico; NOR ≡ Norway;
PER ≡ Peru; PRT ≡ Portugal; RUS ≡ Russia; SWE ≡ Sweden; USA ≡ United States of America.
1
3Table 3: Monthly Regressions
WITHOUT DISPERSION WITH DISPERSION
Gold Std. Dummy Gold Std. Dummy Dispersion
Individual & MRR
(+): — (+): — (+): —
(−): CHL, ITA. (−): CHL, ITA. (−): —
Individual & IRR
(+): NOR, SWE. (+): AUS, ECU, NOR, SWE. (+): All but BUL, NOR.
(−): PRT. (−): BEL, ITA. (−): —
SUR & MRR
(+): — (+): — (+): —
(−): FRA. (−): ITA. (−): —
SUR & IRR
(+): NOR, PER, SWE. (+): AUS, NOR, SWE. (+): All but BUL, NOR.
(−): ARG, EGT, FRA, PRT. (−): DEN. (−): —
ARG ≡ Argentina; AUS ≡ Austria-Hungary; BEL ≡ Belgium; BRZ ≡ Brazil; BUL ≡ Bulgaria; CHL ≡ Chile; DEN ≡ Denmark;
ECU ≡ Ecuador; EGT ≡ Egypt; FRA ≡ France; GRC ≡ Greece; IND ≡ India; ITA ≡ Italy; MEX ≡ Mexico; NOR ≡ Norway;
PER ≡ Peru; PRT ≡ Portugal; RUS ≡ Russia; SWE ≡ Sweden; USA ≡ United States of America.
1
44 Conclusion
The choice of yield measurement methodologies for historical sovereign bonds has
received scant attention on the literature. This article attempts to ﬁll this omission.
The discussion is highlighted by an empirical exercise that generates different con-
clusions if the deﬁnition of rate of return is modiﬁed.
It was argued that the two most commonly used measurement of yields, the
internal rate of return and the coupon-price ratio require a very stringent set of
hypothesis, often very difﬁcult to comply with. In the former case, it has been
widely supposed that investment position would be held for inﬁnite periods ahead;
thelatteradditionallysupposesthat defaults are nonexistentand unpredictable, even
if on the brink of occurrence. These measurements were used in the literature even
to evaluate bonds in distress.
Periodical rates of return are used instead. They take into account that a typical
investor undertakes portfolio decisions at each period, rather that once in a life-
time. This measurement is simply the coupon-price ratio appended by a principal-
revaluation additive term.
Both rates of return of bonds ﬂoated in London in the classical period (1870–
1914) for twenty countries were collected and compared. The growth of periodical
rates of return is slightly negatively correlated with coupon-price ratios in yearly
frequency, implyingthat the principal revaluation term is indeed of foremost impor-
tance in the calculation of yields of historical sovereign bonds. A zero-correlation,
or even positive and badly correlated situation would sufﬁce to argue that the con-
sidered measurements are very different.
Thesecondsectionanalyzedtheempiricalrelevanceof“goodhousekeepingseal
ofapproval”hypothesisinthelightofthepreviousdiscussion. Several papers onthe
literature, such as Bordo and Rockoff [1996], Obstfeld and Taylor [2003], Cameron
et al. [2006], Schularick [2006], Ferguson and Schularick [2006]and Morys [2007],
argued that countries acquired a better reputation when adopted the gold standard,
and as a resultwere ableto obtainborrowingterms thanotherwiseout oftheregime.
Thispapertriestoreproduce theirresultswithoutchangingtheyearlyfrequency and
themeasurement ofyields. The “good housekeepingseal of approval”wasfound for
ﬁve out of twenty countries (one exhibited positive and signiﬁcant response to gold
standard adoption).
Using monthly rates of return, there are one or two countries that exhibit the
expected effect. Again, “good housekeeping”does not ﬁnd much empirical support.
Even in the class of models that make use of internal rates of return, more countries
seem to exhibit an effect contrary effect to what is expected. Despite the increase of
degrees of freedom due to the increase in frequency, periodical rates of return detect
evidence of “good housekeeping” only for Italy in the preferred speciﬁcation.
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Appendix – Bonds in Sample
ARGENTINA
6% 1866-68 6% Public Wks, 1871 6% 1882
6% Hard $ 9% Treasury Bds 5% 1884
5% 1886 5% Treasury Com. 4.5% Internal Gold Loan
7% National Cedulas 4.5% Stg. Bonds 3.5% External 1889
6% Funding Loan 4% Rly. Guar. Resumption
Bonds
4% Bonds I 1898
4% Bonds II 1898 4% Bonds III 1898 4% Bonds IV 1898
4% Bonds V 1898 5% 1890 5% Int. Gold Loan 1907
7% National Cedulas 5% Gold 1909 5% Gold 1910
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY





Aus. 4% Gold Rentes
Aus. 5% Silver Rent. I Aus. 5% Silver Rent. II Aus. 5% Income Tax I
Aus. 5% Income Tax II Hung. 5% 1871 Hung. 5% 1873
Hung. 6% Gold Rentes Hung. 4% Gold Rentes Hung. 3% Loan 1895
Hung. 6% Treasury Bonds
1873
Hung. 6% Treasury Bonds
1874
Hung. 4% Rentes
Hung. 4.5% Loan 1914
BELGIUM
2.5% 3% 1874 3% 1914
4% 4.5% 7% Stabn. Loan
BRAZIL
4.5% 1860 4.5% 1863 5% 1865
5% 1871 5% 1875 4.5% 1883
5% 1886 4.5% 1888 4% 1889
5% 1895 5% 1898 Funding 4% 1901
5% 1903/05 5% 1907 5% 1908
4% 1910 4% 1911 5% 1913
Continued...
17BULGARIA
6% 1888 6% St. Mrt. Bonds 5% Gold Loan 1902
4.5% Gold Loan 1907 4.5% Gold Loan 1909
CHILE
6% 1822 3% 1842 4.5% 1858
5% 1870 7% 1866 6% 1867
5% 1873 I 5% 1873 II 4.5% 1875
4.5% Conversion 4.5% 1886 4.5% 1887
4.5% 1889 4.5% 1892 4.5% 1893
4.5% 1895 5% 1896 I 5% 1896 II
5% 1905 4.5% 1906 Gold 5% 1909
5% 1910 5% 1911
DENMARK
3% 1825 4% 1862 4% 1850-61
5% Debenture 1864 3% Gold Loan 1894 4% Intl. 1887
3% Amortsble Bds 1897 4% 1912
ECUADOR
1% New Consol New Ext. Bond
EGYPT
5% Pref. 1877-80 4% Uniﬁed 5% Daira Sanieh
5% State Domn. 1878 3.5% Government Pref. 3.5% Government Pref.
Inscribed
4.25% State Domain 4% 1890 Daira Sanieh 3% Gtd. Loan
7% 1862 1st Issue 7% 1862 2nd Issue 7% 1862 2nd Issue II
7% 1864 I 7% 1864 II 7% 1866 I
7% 1866 II 9% 1867 7% 1862
7% 1868 7% Khedive’s Sinking 7% 1873
6% Uniﬁed 5% Khedive 1870
FRANCE
4% 1852 6% Sterling 1870 3.5% 1878 Redm.
3% 1881 4.5% 1883 3% Rentes
3% Redeemable 3.5% Rentes 4% Rentes
4% Treasury Bds. 4.5% 4.5% Treasury Bds.
5% Rentes
GREECE
5% Independence1879 5% 1881 5% 1884
4% Monopoly Loan 6% 1888 4% Rentes I
4% Rentes II 5% Eng. Scrip 1890 5% Funding 1893
4% Loan 1902 5% Nat. Loan 1907 4% Bonds
Continued...
185% Loan 1914 5% 1824-5 I 5% 1824-5 II
5% 1824-5 III 5% 1824-5 III
INDIA
4% India 3.5% India I 4% Deben. Dbs.
3% India I 3.5% Deben. Dbs. 3.25% Deben. Dbs.
3% India II 10.5% India I 10.5% India II
10.5% India III 10.5% India IV 10.5% India V
10.5% India VI 10.5% India VII 10.5% India VIII
10.5% India IX 10.5% India X 5% India Bonds
5% India I 5% India II 5% India III
3.5% India II
ITALY
5% Rentes 1861 5% 1851 Sardinian 6% Italian Irrigation
5% Maremm’na 1862 5% 1865 6% 1868
5% 2nd Issue 1869 3.75% Rentes 4% Rentes
5% 1881
MEXICO
3% 1846 3% 1851 I 6% Anglo-French
6% 1851 II 3% Cons. 1886 6% 1851 III
6% Silver Currency 5% Cons. 1894 5% Cons. II 1894
4% Gold 1904 6% Cons. 1888 5% Bonds
5% Bonds 1893 5% Bonds 1893 Silver
6% 10-year Treasury
NORWAY
4.5% 1876 4.5% 1878 4% 1880
3% 1886 3% 1888 4% 1911
3.5% Bonds
PERU
4.5% 1862 5% 1865 5% Consolidated 1872








5% 1882 3% 1884 3% 1867




5% 1822 4.5% 1850 4.5% 1860
3% 1859 5% 1862 5% Anglo-Dutch I
5% Anglo-Dutch II 5% Anglo-Dutch III 5% Anglo-Dutch IV
5% 1877 5% 1878 I 5% 1878 II
4% Eng. Scrip. Conv. I 4% Eng. Scrip. Conv. II 4% Series III
3.5% Bonds 4% Dvsk Vbsk 4% Rentes I
4% Rentes II 5% 1906 Eng. Scrip. 4.5 1909 % Scrip.
SWEDEN
4.5% Gov. 1864 5% 1868 4.5% Funded 1875
4.5% 1876 4% 1878 3.5% 1880
3% 1888 3% Con. 1894 3.5% 1908
3.5% 1900
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
6% 1862 7% Conf. Loan 1863 5% 1864
6% 1865 6% 1867 5% Funded 1871-3
5% Redeemable 1874 4.5% Funded 1876 4% Funded 1877
6% Redeemable 1881 6% Registered 1881 6% Coup. Bonds 1882
6% 1884 6% 1885 6% 1887
3% 3.5% 4% Loan
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